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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SO MUCH ACTIVITY, SO LITTLE CHANGE: A REPLY TO THE
CRITICS OF BATTERED WOMEN’S SELF-DEFENSE

KIT KINPORTS*
Prior to 1970, the term “domestic violence” referred to ghetto riots and
urban terrorism, not the abuse of women by their intimate partners.1 Today, of
course, domestic violence is a household word. After all, it has now been ten
years since the revelation of football star O.J. Simpson’s history of battering
purportedly sounded “‘a wake-up call for all of America’”;2 ten years since
Congress enacted legislation haled as “‘a milestone . . . truly a turning point in
the national effort to break the cycle’” of violence;3 and twenty years since
Farrah Fawcett’s portrayal of Francine Hughes in the movie The Burning Bed
supposedly “left an indelible mark upon society’s collective consciousness.”4
Despite these and numerous other “milestones” and “wake-up calls,” domestic
violence continues to be a seemingly intractable problem in this country.
Substantial numbers of women are still beaten by their husbands and
boyfriends every day, and many of them die as a result.5 A much smaller
number of women strike back and kill their abusers, but it is these cases – and

* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B. 1976, Brown University; J.D. 1980,
University of Pennsylvania.
1. See Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements
on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1290 n.42 (2000).
2. Fred Brown, New Domestic Violence Laws Take Effect: State Makes It Easier to Keep
Abusers at Bay, DENV. POST, July 2, 1994, at B1 (quoting U.S. Representative Patricia
Schroeder).
3. George Lardner, The Law Stops at the State Line: Ignorance, Confusion Paralyze the
Cops, WASH. POST, June 2, 1996, at C3 (quoting Attorney General Janet Reno’s description of
the Violence Against Women Act).
4. Jay B. Rosman, Domestic Violence: Recent Amendments to the Florida Statutes, 20
NOVA L. REV. 117, 125-26 (1995). Francine Hughes, a battered woman who killed her sleeping
husband in 1977, was ultimately acquitted on grounds of temporary insanity. See FAITH
MCNULTY, THE BURNING BED (1980); THE BURNING BED (Anchor Bay Entertainment 1984)
(starring Farrah Fawcett).
5. I use gendered terms here because statistics show that the overwhelming majority of
domestic batteries involve men assaulting women. See, e.g., CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH
WELCHANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 2 (2000) (finding that 85%
of reported incidents were perpetrated by men). For statistics on the overall incidence of
domestic violence and intimate-partner killings, see infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
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the self-defense issues they raise – that seem to receive a disproportionate
share of the attention.6
The most troublesome self-defense questions arise, of course, in cases
involving non-confrontational killings – where the woman struck back before
or after a beating, or, most controversially, when her abuser was asleep.
Although statistically most killings do not fall into this category,7 they raise the
most difficult questions and have generated the most interest. Can a woman
who kills under these circumstances legitimately argue that she acted in selfdefense – that, pursuant to the prevailing definition of the defense, she honestly
and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
harm?8 A number of critics contend that she cannot, and it is my purpose here
to evaluate the various arguments they have advanced.
I. INTRODUCTION
In some respects, much has changed in the intervening years since the term
“domestic violence” entered the public consciousness. Beginning in 1976,
state legislatures began to enact domestic violence reform statutes that made
available at least temporary orders of protection on an ex parte basis and
authorized longer-term protective orders with far-reaching remedies.9 Within
four years, such legislation had been passed in forty-five states and the District
of Columbia, and it now exists in all fifty states.10 In 1994, after four years of
intensive lobbying by women’s groups, Congress passed the Violence Against
Women Act, the first comprehensive federal response to the problem of

6. A recent Lexis search using the terms “battered women” and “self-defense” yielded 772
law journal articles, but only 198 court opinions during the past ten years. When the search was
narrowed to “battered women w/10 self-defense and date > 1992,” 373 journal articles and only
62 court opinions were retrieved.
7. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 396-401 (1991) (noting that her findings –
that three-fourths of the 223 killings she studied occurred under confrontational circumstances –
confirmed similar results in other studies); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1235, 1253 (2001) (reaching similar findings in a survey of seventy cases where battered
women charged with homicide raised self-defense claims and imminence was at issue).
8. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7
(1986).
9. See CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW
498 (2001). In addition to prohibiting the abuser from committing further acts of violence, an
order of protection may bar him from having any contact with the victim whatsoever and may
also grant her other remedies – including possession of the residence or other property, custody,
child support, or other economic relief. See generally Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff,
Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 910-1030 (1993).
10. See DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 498.
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domestic violence.11 Among other things, this federal legislation authorized
the expenditure of almost a third of a billion dollars for battered women’s
shelters over a five-year period, required states to recognize and enforce
protective orders entered in other states, and made it a federal crime to cross
state lines in order to violate an order of protection.12
In the realm of criminal law, state legislatures have taken a variety of steps
in an effort to alter the law’s traditional laissez faire attitude toward domestic
violence.13 Although the police historically were not allowed to make
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors like assault unless the crime was
committed in their presence, nearly every state has now expanded police arrest
powers to change that rule for domestic violence cases.14 Faced with police
reluctance to exercise those powers, in 1977 Oregon became the first state to
enact a mandatory arrest law, requiring the police to arrest where they had
probable cause to believe a domestic battery had occurred.15 Today, twentyone other states and the District of Columbia have enacted similar legislation.16
In addition, some states have increased the penalties for domestic battery,17 and
some have even created specialized domestic violence courts to handle these
cases.18
Nevertheless, battered women continue to confront hurdles as they attempt
to avail themselves of the fruits of these reform efforts. There still is not
enough shelter space to meet the needs of domestic violence victims. A survey
in New York City several years ago found that the city’s shelters could

11. Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
12. Id. at 1926-34. The act’s most controversial provision, however, which created a federal
civil damages action against anyone who committed a crime of violence motivated by gender,
was struck down by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
The Court reasoned that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress power to reach intrastate,
non-economic activity even if it had an “aggregate effect on interstate commerce,” and that the
legislation could not be justified under Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
because it was aimed at private individuals. Id. at 617, 626.
13. See, e.g., ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 164-67 (1987) (describing
the law’s historic reluctance to intervene in such “private” matters, as evidenced by the “rule of
thumb,” which permitted a man to beat his wife so long as he used a stick no bigger than his
thumb).
14. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1171, 1184 (2002).
15. See OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055(2)(a) (2001).
16. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 14, at 1184-85 (citing statutes). An additional
seven states have enacted legislation providing that arrests are preferred in domestic violence
cases. See id. For discussion of the impact of mandatory arrest laws, see infra note 27.
17. See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1578 n.302 (1998).
18. See Tsai, supra note 1.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

158

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:155

accommodate only one-quarter of requests.19 Further, some experts estimate
that as many as half of all women and children who are homeless today are
fleeing from violent homes.20
The civil protective order process has proven to be far from a panacea, as it
has become apparent that seeking an order of protection can be a risky
proposition for a battered woman. It can be risky in a physical sense:
“[b]attering is about domination,”21 and batterers often react violently when
they feel they are losing control – when women try to leave or otherwise assert
their independence, for example, by filing for an order of protection.22 The
protective order process can also be risky for mothers because state authorities
are increasingly bringing abuse and neglect proceedings as well as criminal
failure-to-protect charges against them, not only when children are themselves
victims of abuse but also when they are exposed to abuse by witnessing
beatings received by their mothers.23 Moreover, it is now more common for a
batterer to respond to a woman’s request for a protective order by likewise
seeking an order against her, and judges are often tempted to grant such mutual
orders of protection.24 Finally, enforcement issues continue to be the
19. See The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers with “Failure
to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 859 (2000) (citing 1997-98
figures). An oft-cited Senate Report found in 1992 that there are three times as many animal
shelters as shelters for battered women in this country. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF
AMERICA 26 (Comm. Print 1992). See also Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies,
Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered
Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1020-21 (1995) (describing the reasons why
African-American women are hesitant to turn to shelters).
20. See Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm
of Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1076
(1995).
21. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53 (1991).
22. See Tsai, supra note 1, at 1292 (citing studies finding that 50% to 60% of protective
orders are violated within two years, and a third study which reported that “17% of victims killed
in domestic incidents had obtained orders of protection”); Jill Smolowe, When Violence Hits
Home, TIME, July 4, 1994, at 18 (quoting forensic psychiatrist Park Dietz’s statement, “‘[a]
restraining order is a way of getting killed faster’”). For further discussion of the dangers of
leaving an abusive relationship, see infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
23. See Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 157, 193 (2003) (concluding that an order of protection can be “a license to entrap”
rather than “a ticket to freedom”); The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, supra note 19, at
849; Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272 (2001).
24. See Mahoney, supra note 21, at 75-76 (noting that mutual orders are “routinely” granted
in some jurisdictions); Philip Trompeter, Gender Bias Task Force: Comments on Family Law
Issues, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2001) (finding that “[m]ore than half of the family
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“Achilles’ heel” of the protective order system.25 Although studies suggest
that at least half of protective orders are violated at least once, and many are
violated repeatedly,26 the police are still much more likely to arrest in a case
involving stranger assault, and they are reluctant to arrest unless the abuser
committed some independent crime.27 Judges are similarly loathe to

law attorneys [surveyed by the Virginia Gender Bias Task Force] report that courts issue mutual
protective orders where allegations do not warrant their issuance”); Elizabeth Topliffe, Note, Why
Civil Protection Orders Are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective
Orders Are Not, 67 IND. L.J. 1039, 1054 n.119 (1992) (citing findings from three state gender
bias studies).
25. PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS:
LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 49 (1990). See also Kit
Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical
Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 220-46 (1993)
(describing the enforcement problems reported in a nationwide survey of domestic violence
organizations).
26. See Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic
Violence Victims, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214, 240 (Eve S. Buzawa
& Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (finding that 60% of orders were violated within one year
following their issuance); Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male
Batterers: Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS
WORK?, supra, at 192, 199-200 (reporting that almost half of all orders were violated within two
years). According to one of these studies, more than one-quarter of women were subjected to
severe violence in the year after they obtained an order of protection, more than one-fifth received
death threats, and more than half experienced psychological abuse. See Harrell & Smith, supra,
at 223-25. See also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27. See Eve S. Buzawa, Thomas L. Austin & Carl G. Buzawa, The Role of Arrest in
Domestic Versus Stranger Assault: Is There a Difference?, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING
ORDERS WORK?, supra note 26, at 150, 161 (finding that “incidents involving strangers result in
an arrest 33% of the time, compared with 28% for acquaintances and 18% for domestic”). See
also Ammons, supra note 19, at 1022-29 (describing the greater hurdles African-American
women face in trying to obtain police protection). Note that the overwhelming majority of states
make the violation of protective orders a crime, although it can lead to felony charges in only six
states. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 9, at 1096-97.
Police reluctance to arrest is evident even in states with mandatory arrest laws. In those
jurisdictions, the police may refuse to arrest despite the mandatory arrest requirement on the
grounds that they lack probable cause, see Barbara J. Hart, Arrest: What’s the Big Deal, 3 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207, 210 (1997), or they may delay so long in responding that the batterer
is no longer on the scene when they arrive. See Buzawa, Austin & Buzawa, supra, at 156 (citing
National Criminal Victimization Survey finding that “police respond within 5 minutes in 36% of
cases in which the offender is a stranger and in only 24% of cases in which the offender is an
intimate”). Moreover, mandatory arrest laws have had the effect of increasing the number of
women arrested, as the practice of dual arrests has become more common. See Hart, supra, at
210. At least fourteen state legislatures have responded to this last trend by amending their
mandatory arrest statutes to authorize arrest of only the primary aggressor. See Cecelia M.
Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for Battered Immigrants Lost in the
Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 185 n.113 (1999) (citing statutes). While some believe that
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incarcerate, and “few batterers ever see the inside of a jail cell, even when
convicted of a serious offense”; instead, probation is the most common
sanction for such violations.28
Most importantly, the incidence of domestic violence is still unacceptably
high. In 1992, the Surgeon General reported that domestic violence was the
“‘single largest cause of injury to women in the United States.’”29 More recent
statistics show that more than one-fifth of all women report having been
physically assaulted by their partner at some point in their lives.30 At least one
million women experience such assaults each year,31 and some put the figure
much higher.32 Moreover, while the number of women killed by their partners
has declined in recent years,33 that figure has not decreased as dramatically as
the overall murder rate.34
such amendments have been effective, see Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step
Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 565, others
report that the police continue to arrest women, especially women of color. See Espenoza, supra,
at 185-86.
It is important to note that some studies question whether arrests are even effective in
deterring domestic abuse. See Jannell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter
Domestic Violence?, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 26, at 43,
48-49 (reporting that arrests reduced domestic violence only in certain cities, only for employed
batterers, and only in the short run).
28. Hanna, supra note 17, at 1523.
29. S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 36-37 (1990) (quoting Susan MacManus & Nikki Van
Hightower, Limits on State Constitutional Guarantees: Lessons from Efforts to Implement
Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 269, 269 (1989)).
30. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF
THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 26 (2000)
(22.1% of women surveyed in the 1995-96 National Violence Against Women Survey).
31. See id. (reporting an annual total of 4.5 million physical assaults affecting 1.3 million
women, for an annual victimization rate of 44.2 assaults per 1,000 women over the age of
seventeen).
32. See S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 30 (1990) (estimating that three to four million women are
battered each year).
33. In 1971, for example, at least 1,077 women were murdered by their husbands, see
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1971: UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 9, 114 (1972) [hereinafter 1971 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS], whereas at least 1034
women were killed by their husbands or boyfriends in 2001. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2001: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 24 (2002)
[hereinafter 2001 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS]. I use the term “at least” here because the
relationship among the parties is unreported for some homicides.
34. The total number of murders decreased by 35.3% between 1991 and 2001, while the
number of women killed by their partners decreased by only 22.3%. Compare FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1991: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 13, 19
(1992) (24,703 total murder victims, 1,330 of whom were women killed by their partners), with
2001 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 33, at 19, 24 (15,980 total murder victims, 1,034 of
whom were women killed by their partners).
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While it used to be conventional wisdom that women committed half of all
spouse killings,35 recent years have witnessed a change in that figure. Now,
approximately three-quarters of intimate-partner killings involve male
perpetrators and female victims.36 What has remained constant, however, is
that approximately one-third of all female murder victims each year are killed
by their partners.37 By comparison, only a small percentage of male victims
are killed by their wives or girlfriends.38 Nevertheless, it is that small minority
of homicides – killings that often take place in the context of an abusive
relationship39 – that have attracted so much attention.
Although the number of battered women who kill has remained small, the
domestic violence reform movement has not ignored the self-defense issues
arising in those cases. Initially, battered women encountered evidentiary
hurdles when they tried to introduce expert psychological testimony describing
the so-called “battered woman syndrome”40 in support of their self-defense

35. See, e.g., 1971 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 33, at 9 (reporting that 52% of the
spouse killings that year were perpetrated by husbands); Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Sociological
Analysis of Homicide, in STUDIES IN HOMICIDE 15, 23 (Marvin E. Wolfgang ed., 1967) (finding
that 53 of the 100 spouse killings reported in Philadelphia between 1948 and 1952 were
committed by men).
36. The 1,034 women murdered by their husbands or boyfriends in 2001 represented 77.8%
of intimate-partner killings. See 2001 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 33, at 24.
37. Compare 1971 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 33, at 9, 114 (reporting that
31.2% of female murder victims were killed by their husbands), with 2001 UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS, supra note 33, at 27 (reporting that 32.2% of female murder victims were killed by
their husbands or boyfriends).
38. In 2001, only 2.8% of male murder victims were killed by their wives or girlfriends; in
1971, 7.8% of male victims were killed by their wives. See 2001 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS,
supra note 33, at 22-27; 1971 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 33, at 9, 114. See also
LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
FACTBOOK: VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES 5 (1998) (reporting similar percentages for the period
1976-96). These murder figures are consistent with the general findings that “violence against
women is predominantly intimate partner violence,” whereas “men are predominantly victimized
by strangers.” TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 30, at 46.
39. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 520 (1996)
(citing studies concluding that “at least forty-five percent and perhaps as many as ninety-seven
percent [of women imprisoned for killing a partner] were abused by the person they killed”). See
also Maguigan, supra note 7, at 397 n.67 (reporting that “[m]ost female homicide defendants had
been battered by the men whom they killed”); Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse
Excuse and the Resurgence of Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1454 n.123
(1998).
40. The term originated with psychologist Lenore Walker. See generally LENORE WALKER,
THE BATTERED WOMAN xv (1979). For a description of the battered woman syndrome, see infra
notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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claims. Now, such testimony is routinely admitted in every state,41 often as a
result of judicial decision, but sometimes by virtue of legislation.42 Likewise,
some state legislatures have amended their self-defense laws to make clear that
prior acts of domestic violence on the part of the decedent are admissible.43 In
addition, a number of courts now require that trial judges give jury instructions
explaining how such testimony is relevant to the defendant’s self-defense
claim.44
Some courts have gone even further, taking the position that the objective
element of self-defense – which asks whether the defendant’s belief in the need
for defensive force was reasonable – must be evaluated by considering how a
“reasonable battered woman,” or a reasonable person with the defendant’s
history of abuse, would have perceived the situation.45 In Bechtel v. State, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals went further still, adopting a special jury
instruction for battered women’s self-defense cases that struck the pattern jury
instruction’s reference to “a reasonable person” and instead advised the jury to
consider whether “a person, in the circumstances and from the viewpoint of the

41. See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in
Criminal Cases, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING
BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 3 (1996).
42. See id. at 15 (citing twelve such state statutes). Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 558 (2001) (observing that courts have been
more receptive than legislatures to battered women’s self-defense claims and that “most of the
favorable legislation simply ratified previous court decisions”).
43. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(d)(1) (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.050(3)
(Banks-Baldwin 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.061 (1997). See also LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art.
404A(2) (West 1995) (creating an exception to the usual rule – which bars evidence of a victim’s
“dangerous character” absent “a hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part of the victim” –
for self-defense cases involving “a history of assaultive behavior” between parties who “lived in a
familial or intimate relationship”).
44. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 823 (Ga. 1997) (requiring modification of
pattern self-defense instruction “in all battered person syndrome cases” to make clear that
“evidence that the defendant suffers from battered person syndrome . . . relates to the issue of the
reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that the use of force was immediately necessary, even
though no use of force against the defendant may have been, in fact, imminent”); Boykins v.
State, 995 P.2d 474, 479 (Nev. 2000) (requiring instruction informing the jury that evidence of
battered woman syndrome may be considered “when determining the defendant’s state of mind at
the time of the killing and whether she acted in self-defense,” and in evaluating “the
reasonableness of her belief that she was about to suffer imminent death or great bodily harm”).
45. See Smith, 486 S.E.2d at 822-23; State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988); State
v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (“an otherwise reasonable person who is
suffering from battered spouse syndrome”); Boykins, 995 P.2d at 476; State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d
564, 575 (N.J. 1997); People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); State v.
Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1345 (Ohio 1997). But cf. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal.
1996), described infra at notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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defendant, would reasonably have believed that she was in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm.”46
Finally, a few states have amended their substantive self-defense rules in
other ways in an effort to make the law more responsive to battered women
defendants. In Weiand v. State, for example, the Florida Supreme Court
overturned one of its prior decisions and modified the castle exception to its
retreat rule so that a defendant is no longer required to retreat before using
deadly force at home against a cohabitant.47 The court reached that decision in
part because of its belief that “[i]mposing a duty to retreat from the home may
adversely impact victims of domestic violence” and “[a] jury instruction on the
duty to retreat may reinforce common myths about domestic violence.”48
While the Florida change applies to all criminal cases, the Kentucky legislature
46. Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 11 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). The text of the jury instruction
the court adopted for cases involving battered women is as follows (with the language omitted
from the pattern jury instruction in brackets):
A person is justified in using deadly force in self-defense if that person [reasonably]
believed that use of deadly force was necessary to protect herself from imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm. Self-defense is a defense although the danger to life or
personal security may not have been real, if a [reasonable] person, in the circumstances
and from the viewpoint of the defendant, would reasonably have believed that she was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.
Id. Cf. Valdez v. State, 900 P.2d 363, 378 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (explaining that the approach
adopted in Bechtel applies only in cases involving battered women and that “[i]n all other selfdefense cases, [the pattern jury instruction] is to be administered in its original form”).
The concurring opinion in Bechtel called the majority’s approach somewhat “puzzling”
because the modified instruction “include[d] the reasonableness requirement” in the last clause
despite the court’s purported intent to “‘strik[e] the words “reasonably” and “reasonable” from
[the] instruction.’” See Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 15-16 (Parks, J., concurring in the result) (quoting
the majority opinion). But cf. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) (similarly
holding that a “defendant’s conduct is not to be judged by what a reasonably cautious person
might or might not do or consider necessary to do under the like circumstances,” but instead
requiring the jury “to place itself as best it can in the shoes of the accused, and then decide
whether or not the particular circumstances surrounding the accused at the time he used force
were sufficient to create in his mind a sincere and reasonable belief that the use of force was
necessary to protect himself”).
47. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1050-57 (Fla. 1999). The majority of jurisdictions in
this country do not require a defender to retreat before resorting to self-defense. In the minority
of states (like Florida) that do impose a retreat requirement, almost all have adopted a “castle
doctrine” exception for the home, although they disagree as to whether that castle exception
applies when one is attacked at home by a co-occupant. See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 8, §
5.7(f).
48. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1052, 1054. See also State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 570-71
(N.J. 1997) (agreeing that the cohabitant exception to the castle doctrine “disadvantage[s]
women” and is “inherently unfair” to battered women, and therefore “commend[ing] to the
Legislature consideration of the application of the retreat doctrine in the case of a spouse battered
in her own home”).
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has amended its self-defense statute for domestic violence cases only, adopting
a definition of “imminence” that makes clear that “in the context of domestic
violence and abuse . . . , belief that danger is imminent can be inferred from a
past pattern of repeated serious abuse.”49
As explained below,50 these are far from radical changes to well-accepted
self-defense doctrine. Nevertheless, much has been written, both on these
reforms specifically and more generally on the topic of battered women’s selfdefense. The notion that battered women who kill under non-confrontational
circumstances might have a legitimate self-defense claim has been subject to
criticism on a variety of fronts. It is my purpose here to evaluate these
criticisms.
In so doing, I have catalogued the objections into five categories. Part II
addresses the claim that battered women cannot hope to satisfy the objective
“reasonableness” requirement of the self-defense standard. Part III then
describes various criticisms leveled at the battered woman syndrome theory,
and Part IV considers the imminence requirement as applied in this context.
Part V discusses the contention that battered women are really advancing an
excuse rather than a justification for their act, and Part VI analyzes the
argument that these self-defense claims raise the specter of determinism and
create an “abuse excuse.” After examining these various objections, I
conclude that, while recent advances in psychological research have shed light
on the effects of battering and on the best way of presenting that information in
support of a battered woman’s self-defense claim, most of these critiques are
misguided and, as I have argued elsewhere,51 even non-confrontational killings
by battered women can fit within traditional self-defense doctrine.
II. THE REASONABLENESS INQUIRY
Critics of battered women’s self-defense claims often focus on the
objective component of the self-defense standard, arguing that even if a
battered woman who killed under non-confrontational circumstances honestly
believed that defensive force was necessary,52 her belief could not have been
reasonable.53 But, under conventional self-defense doctrine, the objective
49. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.010(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
50. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing the admissibility of the
abuser’s prior violence) & 60-74 (analyzing the reasonable battered woman standard).
51. See Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393
(1988).
52. In some jurisdictions, an honest, unreasonable belief in the need to use defensive force
gives rise to a claim of “imperfect” self-defense, resulting in a manslaughter conviction. See
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 231-32 (3d ed. 2001).
53. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The “New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome,” CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1995, at 3, 12.
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element of the defense asks whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s
circumstances would have believed she was in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily harm.54 For example, the criminal law has traditionally
permitted defendants to introduce evidence of the decedent’s violent history or
reputation to support their claim that they both honestly – and reasonably –
believed the decedent posed a threat to them.55
Thus, even the so-called “objective” standard of self-defense is not
completely objective, but at least partially particularistic – and rightly so,
because otherwise defendants are held to an unrealistic standard. As Susan
Estrich has observed, “a purely objective standard is unduly harsh because it
ignores the characteristics which inevitably and justifiably shape the defender’s
perspective, thus holding him (or her) to a standard he simply cannot meet.”56
A battered woman’s history and pattern of battering are among the
circumstances relevant in evaluating what a reasonable person in her situation
would have believed.57 As one court explained, self-defense law “requires the
jury to place itself figuratively in the defendant’s shoes and to determine the
reasonableness of the defendant’s belief from the facts and circumstances as
the defendant perceived them,” and “[i]n order to determine what constituted
‘defendant’s shoes,’ the jury must know whether or not a defendant is a
battered person.”58 In fact, this evidence is no different from the evidence of
the decedent’s violent actions or propensities that has long been admitted in
support of self-defense claims.59

54. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986) (denying that “an objective
standard [of self-defense] means that the background and other relevant characteristics of a
particular actor must be ignored,” and instead observing that “a determination of reasonableness
must be based on the ‘circumstances’ facing a defendant or his ‘situation,’” including “any
relevant knowledge the defendant had about [the victim]” and “any prior experiences he had
which could provide a reasonable basis for a belief . . . that the use of deadly force was necessary
under the circumstances”). See generally DRESSLER, supra note 52, at 238.
55. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 161 U.S. 85, 88 (1896).
56. Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1434 (1990). See also
Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical
Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 449-50 (1981)
(concluding that “[t]he result of taking into account the social reality of the accused is a more
realistic assessment of his or her culpability”).
57. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 53, at 11; Robert F. Schopp, Barbara J. Sturgis & Megan
Sullivan, Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between
Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 90.
58. People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
59. See Parrish, supra note 41, at iv (noting that “[a]ny defendant claiming self-defense
would want to bring in information about the deceased’s history of violence against her or him,”
and therefore “[t]his type of ‘social context’ information is not unique to battered women’s selfdefense claims”).
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Similarly, the so-called “reasonable battered woman” standard adopted by
some courts is just a short-hand description for the conventional “reasonable
person under the circumstances” standard that courts apply in all self-defense
cases. Thus, it makes no sense for the California Supreme Court to take the
position it articulates in People v. Humphrey, where it disclaims any intent to
“replace the reasonable ‘person’ standard with a reasonable ‘battered woman’
standard” – reasoning that “the ultimate question is whether a reasonable
person, not a reasonable battered woman, would believe in the need to kill to
prevent imminent harm” – but then goes on to hold that “the jury, in
determining objective reasonableness, must view the situation from the
defendant’s perspective” and “must consider all of the relevant circumstances
in which defendant found herself.”60 The court acknowledges, as it must, that
the defendant’s history of abuse is one of “the relevant circumstances” to be
considered, and it does not deny that her experience as a battered woman must
have colored her “perspective.”61 Thus, the objective standard it adopts seems
not much different from the one it purports to reject.
Nevertheless, Stephen Morse has countered, characteristics like the
defendant’s relative size and strength compared to that of the decedent, or the
decedent’s prior history of violence, are “normal, non-culpable” characteristics
that are properly considered in assessing a self-defense claim, whereas he
suggests that the effects of battering “do not meet the test of normality and
innocence for modifying the objective standard for justification.”62 If by
“normality and innocence,” Morse is referring to the point he makes later that
“not all victims of repeated battering are syndrome sufferers,”63 the standard
for self-defense has always required only that the defendant’s belief in the need
for defensive force be a “reasonable” one – not necessarily the correct one or
one that everyone else in her situation would have endorsed.64 Just as some
battered women do not strike back against their abusive partners, some
individuals who are threatened by stronger aggressors submit to the assault,
walk away, or otherwise manage to defuse the situation, and some who face an
ambiguous situation do not mistakenly assume the other person poses a threat.
Those who do exercise defensive force in these circumstances do not forfeit

60. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7-9 (Cal. 1996).
61. See id. at 9 (noting that the defendant’s history of abuse “was relevant to
reasonableness,” as was “expert testimony about its effects” on her) (emphasis removed).
62. Morse, supra note 53, at 11. This discussion obviously shades into the criticisms of
battered woman syndrome theory discussed in the next section, but is included here because it
directly implicates the objective inquiry made in self-defense cases.
63. Id. For further discussion of this line of argument, see infra notes 190-95 and
accompanying text.
64. See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 8, § 5.7(c).
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their self-defense claim simply because “not all” persons in their situation
would have done so.
On the other hand, by “normality and innocence,” Morse may be referring
to his argument that adopting “a reasonable battered victim syndrome sufferer”
approach “makes a mockery of objective standards,” resulting in the
“relativization of ethical standards” and “threaten[ing] to make right whatever
the agent honestly believes is right.”65 It is obviously true, as George Fletcher
has warned, that “[i]f the reasonable person were defined to be just like the
defendant in every respect, he would arguably do exactly what the defendant
did under the circumstances.”66 Thus, “if the reasonable person has all of the
defender’s characteristics, the standard loses any normative component and
becomes entirely subjective.”67 But, that is an inherent difficulty self-defense
law confronts whenever it tries to determine which of the defendant’s
characteristics are properly considered in making an objective inquiry: the
perennial problem of “striking the balance between the defender’s subjective
perceptions and those of the hypothetical reasonable person.”68
Moreover, it is interesting to note, as Victoria Nourse has pointed out, that
prior to 1960 the criminal law did not pay much attention to the precise
definition of “the reasonable person.”69 Nevertheless, the purported neutrality
of that unquestioned “reasonable person” standard masked the gender and race
bias underlying it.70 Its assumption of a male model of behavior was implicit
rather than express, therefore now “mak[ing] all other normative claimants
appear illegitimate, as if they were political arguments asking for special
favors.”71 Battered women, however, seek no “special favors.” Even before
commentators pointed out the biases hidden in the reasonable person standard,
the objective element of self-defense was never purely objective; as noted
above, it always included some of the defendant’s subjective characteristics.
The only question then, as now, is the value judgment where we draw the
line.72
65. Morse, supra note 53, at 13.
66. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 513 (1978).
67. Estrich, supra note 56, at 1435.
68. Id. at 1434.
69. See Nourse, supra note 7, at 1296.
70. See, e.g., Donovan & Wildman, supra note 56, at 448 (observing that “[n]ot
coincidentally, the allegedly universal, classless, and sexless nature of the reasonable man was a
device which promoted the myth of the objective, value-free nature of the criminal law”).
71. Nourse, supra note 7, at 1299.
72. Some observers have commented on the ambiguity in self-defense law’s notion of
“reasonableness” – whether it is a descriptive term (akin to “common” or “typical”) or a
normative concept. See, e.g., Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 495-96 (1996); Robert P.
Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 503
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Although the precise placement of that line may be open to debate, it
should be beyond dispute that the effects of battering are relevant
considerations. As a Justice Department report commissioned by Congress
recently concluded, “[a]n extensive and continually expanding research
literature” – drawn from “the interdisciplinary fields of domestic violence and
traumatic stress [and] reflect[ing] work in psychology, psychiatry, sociology,
nursing, criminal justice, and other disciplines” – “supports the assertion that
domestic violence is associated with a wide range of traumatic psychological
reactions.”73 In fact, it was the recognition of this very fact that led courts to
overcome their initial reluctance and admit expert testimony describing the
battered woman syndrome in support of battered women’s self-defense
claims.74 While this much may be conceded, battered woman syndrome theory
has come under increasing attack from almost all sides. It is to those criticisms
that the next section turns.
III. BASHING THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Psychologist Lenore Walker, one of the early pioneers in the field of
domestic violence, coined the term “battered woman syndrome” to describe the
effects of intimate-partner abuse.75 In her 1979 book, The Battered Woman,
Walker observed that women who find themselves in abusive relationships
tend to share certain characteristics, including low self-esteem, passivity, and
traditional attitudes about male-female roles.76 Walker also found that many
battering relationships are characterized by a cyclical pattern – the so-called
“cycle of violence,” consisting of a tension-building stage, an acute battering
incident, and then a stage of loving contrition.77 The book also explained
Walker’s theory of “learned helplessness”: once battered women learn that
they cannot control or prevent the beatings, they come to feel that the violence
is unavoidable and that there is no escape from the relationship.78 Walker used
(1996). This is an important observation, but it does not resolve the questions at issue here.
Whether descriptive or normative, the reasonableness inquiry ought to carry the same
connotations in all cases, and my point here is that battered women are asking only that their selfdefense claims be assessed according to the same reasonableness standards generally applied in
other cases.
73. Mary Ann Dutton, Validity of “Battered Woman Syndrome” in Criminal Cases
Involving Women, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE
CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT RESPONDING TO
SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, supra note 41, at 10, 4-5.
74. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
75. WALKER, supra note 40, at xv.
76. See id. at 31-35.
77. See id. at 55-70 (finding that 65% of battered women reported a tension-building stage
and 58% a contrition phase).
78. See id. at 45-54.
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these findings to try to dispel the myth that battered women remain in abusive
relationships because they are masochists.79 Instead, she pointed out that
women stay for a number of reasons, which included not only their feelings of
helplessness and the reinforcement they received during the third stage of the
cycle, but also other factors – namely, fear, lack of resources, concern for
children, love for their partner, shame, and lack of external support resulting
from the batterer’s efforts to isolate them from others.80
The “battered woman syndrome” has now become a popular punching bag,
with the Justice Department report concluding that the term “does not reflect
the breadth of empirical knowledge now available concerning battering and its
effects” and thus “is no longer useful or appropriate.”81 Criticisms of the
battered woman syndrome fall primarily into four categories: that the theory
implies pathology or mental disorder rather than reasonableness; that it creates
a new “battered woman syndrome” defense; that it suggests a model for all
battering relationships that does not fit some women; and that the learned
helplessness portion of the theory is inconsistent with a woman’s use of selfdefense.82 Each of these objections will be described in turn.
79. See id. at 20.
80. See WALKER, supra note 40, at 49-50, 64-69, 127-49.
81. Overview and Highlights of the Report, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY AND
USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT
RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, supra note 41, at vii
(noting that this was “[a] significant conclusion of all three reports” included in the Justice
Department report). See also Dutton, supra note 73, at 17 (characterizing the term “battered
woman syndrome” as “imprecise” and “misleading,” and observing that it “does not adequately
reflect the breadth or nature of knowledge concerning battering and its effects”); Mary Ann
Dutton, Impact of Evidence Concerning Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Trials Involving
Women, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING
BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, supra note 41, at 5 (finding a “consensus” in a focus
group composed of judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors, expert witnesses, and advocates that
the term “battered woman syndrome” is “too ambiguous and too narrow” and therefore “not
adequate to portray the necessary information to assist the factfinder” in a criminal trial involving
a battered woman).
82. In addition to the four criticisms discussed here, some commentators have raised
methodological objections to Walker’s study. See, e.g., David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright,
The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 75-79, 104-07
(1997); David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and
Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 636-43 (1986). Others have responded to these
objections, noting the ethical considerations that make “true social science experiments” in this
context impractical, see Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered
Woman Syndrome by and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 789, 797 (1996); the “virtual impossibility of conducting a controlled
experiment,” Mosteller, supra note 72, at 481; the widespread use of surveys in other scientific
research, see Schopp, Sturgis & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 55; and the fact that prior to Walker’s
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First, critics of the theory argue that the term “syndrome” tends to
“pathologize” battered women83 and thus, by definition, negates the
reasonableness of their perceptions.84 Just as “the reasonable psychotic”85 or
“the reasonable paranoid schizophrenic”86 is an oxymoron, the argument goes,
so the “reasonable syndrome sufferer”87 cannot be deemed to have acted

work, social scientists without her “ideological commitment” had “failed even to perceive
violence against women as a problem worthy of study” and even “avowedly neutral scholars in
this area turned out to have a political agenda of their own.” Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial:
Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 92
(1998).
83. Faigman & Wright, supra note 82, at 69. See also Rebecca D. Cornia, Current Use of
Battered Woman Syndrome: Institutionalization of Negative Stereotypes About Women, 8 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 99, 102 (1997); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 52
(1994) (describing the battered woman syndrome as “a mental disorder, whose characteristic
symptoms cause [women] passively to submit themselves to marriages in which they are so
brutally handled by dominant men that they lose their capacity to make rational choices”);
Dutton, supra note 81, at 6 (reporting concerns expressed by the focus group that “the term
‘battered woman syndrome’ signals disorder, pathology, or a clinical condition”); Patricia Kazan,
Reasonableness, Gender Differences, and Self-Defense Law, 24 MANITOBA L.J. 549, 557 (1997)
(noting that the battered woman syndrome makes women seem “deviant and pathological,” and
“has often been read by the courts as evidence of mental incapacitation or insanity”); Margulies,
supra note 82, at 96 (arguing that “the term ‘battered woman’ both pathologizes and homogenizes
women’s experiences, leaving no room for agency”); Overview and Highlights of the Report,
supra note 81, at vii (noting that “the word ‘syndrome’ may be misleading, by carrying
connotations of pathology or disease, or . . . may create a false impression that the battered
woman ‘suffers from’ a mental defect”).
84. For examples of court opinions describing the battered woman syndrome in medical
terms that emphasize the woman’s incapacity and lack of reasonableness, see, e.g., Ex parte
Haney, 603 So. 2d 412, 413 (Ala. 1992) (describing the defense expert as testifying that
defendant “was suffering from a psychological defect, which he characterized as ‘spouse abuse
syndrome’”); State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 56 (Wash. 1994) (Utter, J., dissenting) (noting that
“battered woman syndrome describes a psychological condition produced when a person is
repeatedly subjected to severe abuse,” and that “severe abuse distorts perceptions of harm and its
immediacy in ways that are not readily understandable”); State v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 524, 533 n.11
(W. Va. 1997) (per curiam) (commenting that the defendant “relied upon the battered woman’s
syndrome and other evidence of mental incapacity and upon self-defense as a defense at trial”)
(emphasis added); Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 10 (Wyo. 2000) (observing, in analyzing whether the
prosecution was entitled to notes taken by defense expert who examined the defendant for
battered woman syndrome, that the defendant – whose defense at trial was self-defense –
“asserted an affirmative defense on the basis of diminished capacity and battered woman
syndrome” and therefore “may not argue a deficient mental condition and, at the same time, claim
protection by privilege”).
85. Kazan, supra note 83, at 563.
86. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not
Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 242 (2002). See also Morse, supra
note 53, at 13.
87. Morse, supra note 53, at 12.
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reasonably and thus cannot possibly hope to satisfy the objective component of
the self-defense standard. This criticism is not entirely fair because the
“battered woman syndrome” construct is not necessarily meant to connote
some sort of mental disease or defect, but is simply “a convenient way of
describing a set of characteristics that are common to many (but not all)
battered women.”88 Nevertheless, the use of the term “syndrome” has clinical
connotations and is therefore prone to generate confusion.
Second, critics have argued that the battered woman syndrome creates a
new “battered woman syndrome defense” – a “special excuse for women.”89
But, the “syndrome” itself does not give rise to a defense.90 Rather, the history

88. Parrish, supra note 41, at 2. See also Kazan, supra note 83, at 557 (observing that the
battered woman syndrome was “originally intended to function in a purely descriptive
capacity . . . making it possible for the courts to see past common myths and misconceptions
about the battering relationship”); Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Trials of Battered
Women Who Kill: The Impact of Alternative Forms of Expert Testimony, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 167, 168 (1996) (observing that battered woman syndrome is “merely a descriptive
term”); Lenore E.A. Walker, Psychology and Law, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1170, 1177 (1993) (noting
that the battered woman syndrome, like post-traumatic stress disorder, is “not a mental illness, but
rather a way to clinically describe the impact of abuse on the woman’s state of mind”).
Some courts have recognized as much, noting that the “battered woman syndrome” is
not a mental disease. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 n.3 (Cal. 1996) (using the
term “battered women’s syndrome,” but observing that “‘the preferred term among many experts
today is “expert testimony on battering and its effects” or “expert testimony on battered women’s
experiences,’”” in part because “‘the phrase “battered women’s syndrome” . . . has pathological
connotations which suggest that battered women suffer from some sort of sickness [and] expert
testimony on domestic violence refers to more than women’s psychological reactions to
violence’”) (quoting amicus brief); People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000)
(noting that “Battered Woman Syndrome is not a mental defect or disease,” but rather “is
identified by a series of common characteristics that appear in persons who have been abused for
an extended period of time by the dominant figure in their lives”); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 7
(Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (concluding that “the syndrome is a mixture of both psychological and
physiological symptoms but is not a mental disease in the context of insanity”).
89. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 27-28. See also Morse, supra note 53, at 3 (describing the
“battered victim” defense as a “new affirmative defense[]”).
90. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 73, at 17 (observing that “[t]here is no ‘battered woman
defense,’ per se”). A number of courts seem to have had no trouble recognizing this fact. See,
e.g., Smith v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 822 (Ga. 1997) (observing that “the battered person
syndrome is not a separate defense, but . . . evidence of battered person syndrome is relevant in a
proper case as a component of justifiable homicide by self-defense”); Banks v. State, 608 A.2d
1249, 1253 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (holding that state statute providing for admissibility of
battered spouse syndrome evidence “does not, as appellant, the State, and the trial judge all seem
to believe, create a new defense to murder”; “[r]ather, evidence of the Battered Spouse Syndrome
is offered in support of the state of mind element of perfect or imperfect self-defense”); Boykins
v. State, 995 P.2d 474, 478 (Nev. 2000) (noting that “battered woman syndrome is not a complete
defense” but is “relevant to the reasonableness of an individual’s belief that death or great bodily
harm is imminent”); Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 320 (commenting that “Battered Woman Syndrome
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of violence and the effects of that violence are used in determining whether the
defendant has a standard self-defense claim because she acted under
circumstances where she honestly and reasonably believed she was in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. Nevertheless, some courts
and commentators persist in using the misleading terms “battered woman’s
defense” and “battered woman syndrome defense,” even when they are talking
about standard self-defense claims.91
Third, critics point out that Walker’s theory creates a one-size-fits-all
model that in fact does not accurately describe all abusive relationships.92 The
battered women who actively take steps in an effort to stem the abuse –
sometimes even fighting back – can hardly be viewed as “passive” or
“helpless.” Not only does this model tend to create a profile or stereotype that
each battered woman must meet in order to raise a successful self-defense
claim,93 it also disproportionately disadvantages certain groups of women –
is not a defense to a criminal act,” but instead is “evidence . . . generally recognized as admissible
in cases involving self-defense”); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990) (warning that
“admission of expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome does not establish a new
defense or justification,” but “assist[s] the trier of fact [in] determin[ing] whether the defendant
acted out of an honest belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and
that the use of such force was her only means of escape”); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (S.C.
1986) (admonishing that “this Court is not recognizing the battered woman’s syndrome as a
separate defense” but is only addressing “the relevance of this testimony to a claim of selfdefense”); Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 143 (Wyo. 1995) (noting that state statute permitting the
use of battered woman syndrome testimony “does not create a separate defense; it permits the
introduction of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome when the affirmative defense
of self-defense is raised”).
91. See Parrish, supra note 41, at iii (noting that “the perception that there is a separate
defense called the ‘battered women’s defense,’ or the ‘battered woman syndrome defense,’
persists” among many judges and lawyers). See also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 73, at 17 (arguing that “[t]he knowledge pertaining to
battering and its effects does not rest on a singular construct, as the term ‘battered women
syndrome’ implies”); Margulies, supra note 82, at 71 (observing that the battered woman
syndrome “homogenize[s] women’s experiences” and does not fit those who “consistently reply
in kind”); Raeder, supra note 82, at 790 (noting that admissibility of battered woman syndrome
evidence “depends upon shoehorning women into a syndrome in which they often do not fit”).
93. See, e.g., Faigman & Wright, supra note 82, at 111 (noting that courts may refuse to
admit expert testimony when a defendant “fails to ‘fit’ the ‘typical’ model of a battered woman
who kills”); Maguigan, supra note 7, at 444-45 (arguing that a “reasonable battered woman”
standard creates “a new stereotype” and “invites courts to prevent the fair trials of women who
are not ‘good’ battered women”); Martha Shaffer, The Battered Woman Syndrome Revisited:
Some Complicating Thoughts Five Years After R. v. Lavallee, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 19 (1997)
(concluding that the Canadian experience with battered woman syndrome testimony “raise[s] the
possibility that a stereotype of the ‘authentic’ battered woman is operating, making it difficult for
women who do not fit the mold to make use of self-defence”).
Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474 (Nev. 2000), provides a helpful illustration of the dangers
resulting from the creation of such a model. The dissenting opinion in that case pointed out:
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including women of color94 and women who are financially independent95 –
whom juries are less likely to regard as “helpless.” Moreover, it is a model
that contributes to gender stereotypes by favoring helplessness and passivity,
thereby rewarding women who act in conformance with traditional gender
roles.96 It is thus, according to Anne Coughlin, a “profoundly anti-feminist,”
indeed “misogynist,” defense.97
The jury apparently favored the testimony of the State’s expert . . . that Boykins did not fit
the typical profile of a battered woman. For example, Boykins successfully managed a
brothel with dozens of employees, she was financially independent, and earned
approximately $65,000 annually for her work at the brothel. Moreover, Boykins had
previously exhibited aggressive and dominant personality characteristics.
Id. at 481 (Young, J., dissenting).
94. See, e.g., Ammons, supra note 19, at 1071 (observing that an African-American woman
“must compete with racial and cultural stereotypes that indicate that she is anything but
‘helpless’”); Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223,
1250 (2001) (criticizing battered woman syndrome theory because it is “based upon the white,
middle class woman” and fails to “consider or accommodate other sources of oppression,” for
example, the hesitancy of African-American women to call the police and the “silenc[ing of
Asian-American women] from reporting their abuse by the community pressures and family
values of their ethnicity”); Margulies, supra note 82, at 71 (pointing out that learned helplessness
“conflicts with popular images of African-American women”). See generally Pamela J. Smith,
Comment, We Are Not Sisters: African-American Women and the Freedom to Associate and
Disassociate, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1467, 1482 (1992) (observing that historically it was only white
women who were put on a pedestal and “expected to be submissive”).
95. See Ammons, supra note 19, at 1078 n.259 (observing that “jurors have to be educated
about how a black woman can be economically independent and yet emotionally dependent or
‘trapped’ in a relationship”). See generally S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 37 (1990) (concluding that
domestic violence is not confined to a particular socio-economic group).
96. See, e.g., Cornia, supra note 83, at 101, 122 (describing the battered woman syndrome as
an “immense disservice” because it “sacrifice[s] an emerging image of woman as equal to man”
and “reinforces incapacity and inferiority in the women who invoke it”); Coughlin, supra note 83,
at 50-51 (arguing that the defense “excuses [a battered woman] from criminal liability if she can
prove that she was a passive, obedient wife whose choices were determined, not by her own
exercise of will, but by the superior will of her husband,” and thus “requires women to embrace
precisely the same insulting stereotypes the defense was supposed to explode”); Faigman &
Wright, supra note 82, at 69-70 (commenting that the battered woman syndrome reflects “archaic
stereotypes” and “demeans women”); Margulies, supra note 82, at 64-65 (concluding that the
battered woman syndrome “subtly harms all women by reinforcing images of helplessness and
lack of agency,” thereby suggesting that the “images that have historically limited opportunities
for women . . . reflect an inevitable and natural reality rather than a social construction”); Morse,
supra note 53, at 13 (observing that the battered woman syndrome may “reinforce[] negative
stereotypes of women as helpless victims of their emotions who cannot be expected to behave
rationally”).
97. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 87, 70. Professor Coughlin analogizes the “battered woman
syndrome defense” to the now-discredited marital coercion doctrine, pursuant to which a woman
who committed a crime in her husband’s presence was presumed to have been coerced to do so.
See id. at 31. Coughlin contends that “the marital coercion doctrine reappeared, with its
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Finally, critics make the related point that the theory of “learned
helplessness” cannot account for a battered woman’s use of defensive force.
Christine Littleton has commented on “[t]he tension . . . between [the] image
of battered women as passive and the actual action of those relatively few
battered women who kill their batterers.”98 As George Fletcher succinctly
noted, “[i]t is hardly a sign of helplessness to acquire a gun and . . . kill one’s
psychological captor.”99
Despite the force of some of these criticisms – particularly the last two – it
is important to note that psychological research into the effects of abuse has
advanced since the publication of Walker’s book in 1979. Walker herself, as
well as others, have observed that a history of abuse triggers in some battered
women a form of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”),100 an anxiety
disorder that, according to the American Psychiatric Association, results from
“exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor” that involves experiencing or
witnessing a threat of death or serious injury to oneself or others.101 Common
signs of PTSD are found in some battered women: reliving the traumatic event
in flashbacks or dreams; avoidance (or “flight”) behavior, such as an inability
to recall the traumatic event, a “restricted range of affect,” or efforts to avoid
situations that trigger memories of the event; and arousal (or “fight”)
symptoms, such as hypervigilance, irritability, or sleep disorders.102

patriarchal understandings about women’s incapacity for responsible conduct virtually intact, . . .
in the form of the battered woman syndrome defense.” Id. at 48-49.
98. Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives
on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 29, 30 (also posing the question, “If
these women are so passive, dependent and helpless, where do they get the strength and courage
to live, day after day, with the abuse, humiliation and violence . . . [a]nd, in those rare instances,
where do they get the desperation to kill?”).
99. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS 138 (1995). See also Coughlin, supra note 83, at 81 (arguing that “the learned
helplessness diagnosis . . . is inconsistent with the homicidal act” because “[i]f the woman is
psychologically paralyzed, . . . then it seems much more likely that she will continue to endure
the ongoing violence, rather than resort to such an extreme form of self-help”); Estrich, supra
note 56, at 1433 (noting that women who kill “are, by definition, hardly . . . ‘helpless’ creatures”);
Kazan, supra note 83, at 567, 568 (arguing that learned helplessness “undermines [the battered
woman’s] claim” and makes it “difficult to imagine how [she] might be able to summon the will
to act in her own defense”).
100. Walker, supra note 88, at 1177, 1185. See Dutton, supra note 73, at 19 (noting that
PTSD can be found in somewhere between 31% and 84% of battered women). See also WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203(a) (Michie 2003) (defining battered woman syndrome as a “subset” of
PTSD); People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (describing battered
woman syndrome as “a subcategory or subset of posttraumatic stress syndrome”).
101. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994).
102. See id. at 426-28.
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Although PTSD can develop in “almost anyone” exposed to such a
stressor,103 some critics respond that PTSD, like the battered woman syndrome,
is a mental disorder that, by definition, signifies the absence of reasonableness
and therefore cannot possibly support a self-defense claim.104 Even if it is “a
normal response to an abnormally stressful situation,” several commentators
have written, it remains a “psychological disorder[] because the individual
suffers a recognizable pattern of impaired psychological process.”105 The
“normalcy” of the syndrome may help to “explain[] the situational source of
the disorder,” they continue, but it “does not render the syndrome less a
disorder.”106
By way of comparison, however, the criminal law does not blindly
embrace medical diagnoses of mental disease when it comes to the insanity
defense. In that context, the law has always taken the position that the medical
and legal definitions of mental disease are not necessarily identical because the
two communities have distinct goals and purposes.107 Similarly here, the fact
that a defendant has a diagnosable mental condition according to the medical
profession should not automatically foreclose a self-defense claim or a finding
of reasonableness. The fundamental question for the criminal justice system
should be whether in the particular case the symptoms of that condition
distorted or supported the reasonableness of the defendant’s fear. With respect
to PTSD, some symptoms – for example, hypervigilance – may well suggest
the reasonableness of a defendant’s fear because they make her more alert to
signals of danger.108 Other symptoms – for example, lack of affect or
difficulty remembering the abuse – are neutral and not directly relevant to the
reasonableness of her beliefs at the time she used defensive force.109 And still
others, for example, a flashback that “magnifie[d] the fear and cause[d] the

103. Id. at 426.
104. See Schopp, Sturgis & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 95-96. Cf. Mary Ann Dutton,
Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman
Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1198-99 (1993) (observing that “defining battered woman
syndrome as PTSD frames the issue before the finder of fact as solely a ‘clinical’ phenomena,”
requiring the battered woman “to meet a specific set of criteria,” and therefore risking “the
unintended result . . . that the expert witness constructs for the finder of fact an image of
pathology”).
105. Schopp, Sturgis & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 95.
106. Id. at 96 (acknowledging that they would reach a different conclusion if the term
“normal” in this context signified “free of functional impairment” – as opposed to “statistically
normal” or “understandable” – but concluding that would be “incompatible with the contention
that the battered woman syndrome occurs at all, because the syndrome has been defined as a
pattern of psychological impairment which typically occurs in battered women”).
107. See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 8, § 4.3(c)(2).
108. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
109. See id.
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woman to perceive each successive battering incident as more dangerous than
if it were the first one to occur” – if that perception was unreasonable – will
undermine a self-defense claim by suggesting that her belief in the need to use
defensive force was not reasonable.110 Thus, the fact that PTSD – or even the
much-maligned battered woman syndrome111 – may have psychological
sequelae does not mean that battered women’s self-defense claims are
tantamount to a “reasonable psychotic”112 or “reasonable paranoid
schizophrenic”113 standard of self-defense.
In addition to evidence of PTSD, other experts have found that the socalled “active survivor theory” better captures the experience of battered
women.114 This theory, associated with Edward Gondolf and Ellen Fisher,
observes that, rather than being helpless, battered women “respond to abuse
with helpseeking efforts that are largely unmet,” and they “remain in abusive
situations not because they have been passive but because they have tried to
escape with no avail.”115 Moreover, women tend to step up their helpseeking
efforts as the violence escalates, “attempting, in a very logical fashion, to
assure themselves and their children protection and therefore survival.”116
Gondolf and Fisher also explain that “[t]he so-called symptoms of learned
helplessness may in fact be part of the adjustment to active helpseeking,”
110. Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome Is a Psychological Consequence of
Abuse, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 133, 138-44 (Richard J. Gelles &
D.R. Loseke eds., 1993).
111. But cf. Ammons, supra note 19, at 1080 (commenting that “it seems premature and
cavalier to jettison a trauma theory which is akin to other valid explanations of how humans
respond to violence, just because it might not apply to all battered women”).
112. Kazan, supra note 83, at 563.
113. Burke, supra note 86, at 242.
114. See EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 11-25 (1988). See also Dutton, supra
note 73, at 15-16 (citing studies reporting that “many battered women engage in active efforts to
resist, avoid, escape, and stop the violence against them,” including fighting back physically and
verbally and calling the police); Karla Fischer, Neil Vidmar & Rene Ellis, The Culture of
Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 146 SMU L. REV. 2117, 213536 (1993) (concluding that battered women tend to increase their helpseeking efforts over time,
rather than becoming passive and decreasing such efforts); Littleton, supra note 98, at 41-42
(observing that learned helplessness theory is “markedly inconsistent with Walker’s own
description of a ‘common behavior’ among the battered women she studied” – that they actively
engage in efforts “‘to control other people and events in the environment to keep the batterer from
losing his temper’” and also “‘develop survival or coping skills that keep them alive with minimal
injuries’”) (quoting WALKER, supra note 40, at 34; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME 33 (1984)); Mahoney, supra note 21, at 61-62 (noting that many battered
women seek help or try to leave the abusive relationship, and concluding that it is “the helping
professions, rather than battered women, that [are] afflicted with ‘helplessness’”).
115. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 114, at 11, 17.
116. Id. at 18.
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attributable to “quite natural and healthy responses”: learned helplessness may,
for example, reflect “a temporary manifestation of traumatic shock, . . . an
effort by battered women to save the relationship,” or “an expression of
separation anxiety that understandably accompanies leaving the batterer.”117
The active survivor theory thus “focuses on abusers and on societal
inaction, not on the incapacities of survivors, . . . stress[ing] the power and
control exerted by the abuser, the enforcement of that power by both legal and
cultural norms, and the material, rather than psychological, deficits that make
exiting abusive relationships difficult.”118 In addition to emphasizing the
reasonableness of the battered woman’s actions, this model avoids falling into
the trap of focusing exclusively on the woman and her psychological traits,
thereby diverting attention from the role that the abuser, society, and other
external constraints play in preventing her from protecting herself and leaving
the relationship.119 Moreover, the active survivor theory is “inclusive” and
“open[] to a diverse spectrum of stories,” “instead of relying . . . on an expert’s
monolithic construct of a woman’s subjective mental state.”120 In this respect,
the active survivor theory is consistent with the finding of researchers
generally that not all battered women respond in the same way to a history of
abuse.121
As a result of these developments in our understanding of abusive
relationships, many researchers, expert witnesses, and judges now talk in terms
of “battering and its effects” rather than “the battered woman syndrome.”122
This terminology is intended to minimize the confusion generated by the term
117. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis removed).
118. Margulies, supra note 82, at 113.
119. See Chiu, supra note 94, at 1251-52 (noting that the “lopsided focus on . . . the behavior
of the woman distracts and undermines the need to further explore and understand the
blameworthy and egregious conduct of the man,” thereby representing a “contemporary version[]
of the historical blaming of women for domestic violence”); Dutton, supra note 104, at 1201
(concluding that “expert testimony concerning battered women’s experiences” provides the
“overall social context that is essential for explaining battered women’s responses to violence”);
Susan Stefan, The Cloak of Benevolence, in MARY BECKER, CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN &
MORRISON TORREY, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 322, 324 (2d ed.
2001) (pointing out that “[b]y labeling a reaction to . . . battering . . . as a medical condition to be
treated, it is more likely to be removed from the political sphere – seen as an individual’s medical
condition and not a focal point for political action”).
120. Margulies, supra note 82, at 111.
121. See Dutton, supra note 104, at 1196; Overview and Highlights of the Report, supra note
81, at vii-viii. Note that even Lenore Walker found that the three-stage cycle of violence did not
describe all battering relationships. See supra note 77.
122. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 n.3 (Cal. 1996) (observing that “‘the
preferred term among many experts today is “expert testimony on battering and its effects” or
“expert testimony on battered women’s experiences’””) (quoting amicus brief); Dutton, supra
note 73, at 22; Dutton, supra note 81, at 6.
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“battered woman syndrome” by avoiding any suggestion that the woman
suffers from a “syndrome” or mental impairment or that some sort of profile or
model exists that all battered women must match.123
Nevertheless, some critics persist in arguing that even testimony describing
the active survivor theory or the “effects” of battering creates a “special
excuse[] for women” – one that is “not available to all” defendants but instead
is “designed . . . to provide new excuses for women defendants only.”124 And,
the argument continues, “special excuses for women, in whatever form,
reinforce incommensurable gender differences, in which the qualities
characterized as male inevitably are privileged over those characterized as
female.”125
For a battered woman facing murder charges, however, often the major
hurdle is convincing the judge “to apply the generally applicable standards of
self-defense jurisprudence” to her case – a hurdle that frequently proves
difficult because judges are simply unable “to see battered women’s use of
deadly force as reasonable under established definitions.”126 Battered women

123. It is not evident, however, that any such change in the tenor of expert testimony will
have much impact on the outcome of battered women’s trials. See Schuller & Hastings, supra
note 88, at 181-84 (concluding based on simulated trial experiment that the gender of the juror
made a difference, but that the type of expert testimony did not have much effect on the verdict).
See generally CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELFDEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 41-43 (1987) (reporting results of various studies, most of
which found that approximately two-thirds or three-fourths of battered women are convicted or
plead guilty); Parrish, supra note 41, at 7 (concluding based on survey of state court opinions that
“the defense’s use of or the court’s awareness of expert testimony on battering and its effects in
no way equates to an acquittal”); Shaffer, supra note 93, at 17-19 (reporting, based on five-year
survey of thirty-five Canadian cases in which the battered woman syndrome was raised as a part
of a defense or as a mitigating factor in sentencing, that the Canadian experience belies the
argument that “women charged with killing their batterers are securing acquittals in great
numbers”).
124. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 91, 26.
125. Id. at 91, 90 (concluding, however, that the active survivor theory is “less misogynist
than . . . learned helplessness”).
126. Maguigan, supra note 7, at 432-37 (attributing the high reversal rate she found in
surveying 270 appellate court opinions issued in 223 battered women’s homicide cases – a rate of
40%, compared to the national average of 8.5% – to this factor). See also Parrish, supra note 41,
at 7 (finding a reversal rate of 32% in survey of 152 state court decisions involving battered
women).
For recent cases illustrating Maguigan’s theory, see People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 34749 (Colo. 2001) (reversing defendant’s conviction in part because the trial judge refused to
instruct the jury that defendant had no duty to retreat and that deadly force can be used to prevent
sexual assault); Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1057-58 (Fla. 1999) (concluding that the trial
court erred by excluding testimony of three eyewitnesses who “would have provided the only
direct testimony to support Weiand’s claims of prior abuse,” thus allowing the prosecutor to
“discredit Weiand’s claims of abuse by arguing that no one had ever witnessed any injuries on
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do not seek “special” treatment; they simply ask to be judged by the same rules
that have traditionally been applied to male defendants. Their request to have
the finder of fact consider the effects of battering may look like a request for
special treatment, but that is only because we are so accustomed to making the
same sort of inquiries in cases involving male defendants that they have now
become invisible to us. As Victoria Nourse has pointed out, “group
generalizations are unavoidable in the criminal law.”127 For example, she
notes, “[w]hen juries generalize that men naturally lose control when their
wives cheat . . . , they are making group generalizations.”128 To be sure, men
do not rely on a “male rejection syndrome” in those cases; they do not “call
expert witnesses to explain that a reasonable person would lose self-control
when his wife cheats or leaves.”129 But, that is only because they need not do
so, for “the reasonableness of such arguments is assumed.”130 The reason such
conduct is presumed reasonable with no need for explanation, whereas the
conduct of a battered woman is presumed to be unreasonable, and any request
for explanation is dismissed as special pleading, is because the criminal law
“is, from top to bottom, preoccupied with male concerns and male
perspectives, . . . a system of rules conceived and enforced by men, for men,
and against men.”131
To the extent the argument is that even the erroneous misperception that
battered women are seeking special treatment reinforces gender stereotypes,
this critique is reminiscent of the familiar equal treatment/different treatment
debate that has raged in feminist jurisprudence.132 Advocates of equal
treatment contend that treating female defendants differently from male

Weiand or seen evidence of her husband’s abuse of her”); State v. Rodrigue, 734 So. 2d 608, 612
(La. 1999) (finding that the trial court erred in refusing to apply state statute allowing testimony
of batterer’s prior violence because the parties were not involved in “a current intimate
relationship,” even though “[t]he statute . . . contain[ed] no such requirement” and “certainly did
not contemplate that the battered party would not have the benefit of the provision when the
batterer, as frequently happens, confronts and assaults the former mate shortly after the break-up
of the intimate relationship”).
127. Nourse, supra note 39, at 1443.
128. Id. at 1443-44 (also explaining that “any time the law imposes a reasonable person
standard, it requires that juries make assumptions about human behavior – assumptions that put
the defendant in a group of analogously situated persons”).
129. Id. at 1451.
130. Id. For further discussion of these provocation issues, see infra notes 174, 192-94, and
accompanying text.
131. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
2151, 2151, 2154 (1995).
132. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1
(1994).
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defendants reinforces gender stereotypes.133 Difference feminists point out in
response that the quest for formal equality presumes the absence of gender
differences and that, in a male-dominated society which invariably “privileges”
those “qualities characterized as male,” settling for formal equality tends to
disadvantage women.134 The controversy here is yet another manifestation of
what Margaret Radin has called “the transition problem of the double bind” –
“a series of two-pronged dilemmas in which both prongs are, or can be, losers
for the oppressed.”135 Given the Catch-22 nature of this dilemma, there is, of
course, no perfect solution. To me, however, it seems preferable to take into
account the effects of battering in assessing a battered woman’s self-defense
claim, not only because doing so will permit a more accurate and more
complete – and therefore fairer – assessment of her situation, but also because
otherwise we disadvantage her compared to male defendants for whom the
criminal justice system has historically, though perhaps unconsciously, been
willing to make such accommodations.
IV. THE IMMINENCE REQUIREMENT
Focusing on self-defense’s imminence requirement, some critics argue that
a battered woman who kills under non-confrontational circumstances might
reasonably fear future abuse,136 but she cannot honestly and reasonably believe
she is in imminent danger of harm at the time she acts.137 There are four
responses to this objection.
133. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 351-52 (19841985) (arguing that “the ‘equal treatment’ approach to pregnancy . . . is the one best able to
reduce structural barriers to full workforce participation of women, produce just results for
individuals, and support a more egalitarian social structure”).
134. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1181 (1986) (characterizing the equal
treatment approach as “fundamentally flawed” because “[t]he search for sameness is built around
male norms” and therefore only helps women who “are just like men, or are willing to ascribe to
male values and standards”).
135. Margaret Ann Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1699,
1701, 1704 (1990) (noting that the double bind is a “pervasive” problem for women because
“[f]or a group subject to structures of domination, all roads thought to be progressive can pack a
backlash”).
136. But cf. Danielle R. Dubin, Note, A Woman’s Cry for Help: Why the United States Should
Apply Germany’s Model of Self-Defense for the Battered Woman, 2 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L.
235, 241 (1995) (contending that it is “legally impossible to conclusively establish” that a
sleeping batterer will resume the abuse when he awakes).
137. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 56, at 1433 (commenting that the imminence requirement
“does not allow [a battered woman] to respond eight hours later, or when [the abuser] is asleep”);
Kym C. Miller, Abused Women Abused by the Law: The Plight of Battered Women in California
and a Proposal for Revising the California Self-Defense Law, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S
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First, research shows that battered women tend to become hypersensitive
to their abuser’s behavior and to the signs that predict a beating.138 Many
battered women who kill say that something in the abuser’s behavior changed
or signaled to them that this time he really was serious about carrying out his
threats to kill.139 That experience may enable battered women to recognize the
imminence of an attack at a time when others without their prior experience
would not.
Second, given her history, a battered woman may reasonably come to
believe that the only time she can realistically protect herself is when her
abuser is, for example, asleep. She may have learned that trying to defend
herself during a beating is futile and merely escalates the violence.140 She may
have tried numerous other ways of protecting herself and escaping the
relationship, only to find that the criminal justice system and social service
agencies were unable or unwilling to help her and that her husband would find
her, bring her back, and punish her with even more severe abuse for attempting
to leave him.141 In fact, research shows that battered women are often attacked

STUD. 303, 316 (1994) (arguing that, given the imminence requirement, “a jury can only find that
the woman acted in self-defense by disregarding the mandate of . . . self-defense law”); Richard
A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV.
371, 375 (1993) (concluding that the refusal even to instruct the jury on self-defense in a case
where a battered woman shot her sleeping husband was consistent with “settled [self-defense]
law” because “the threat of death or great bodily harm was not imminent when [she] shot her
husband, not, at least, by any reasonable interpretation of the word imminent”); Dubin, supra note
136, at 240 (arguing that the courts’ interpretation of the imminence requirement “effectively
excludes” self-defense in non-confrontational cases). See also infra note 147 and accompanying
text.
138. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 73, at 8 (observing that “intimate partners generally learn to
read the subtle nuances of each other’s behavior more clearly than can others”); Fischer, Vidmar
& Ellis, supra note 114, at 2119-20 (reporting that, just as “[t]hrough daily interaction and shared
history every couple develops idiosyncratic modes of communication, . . . [a] gesture that seems
innocent to an observer is instantly transformed into a threatening symbol to the victim of
abuse”); Morse, supra note 53, at 11-12 (noting that hypervigilance would be helpful to show the
reasonableness of a defendant’s perception of danger); Schopp, Sturgis & Sullivan, supra note 57,
at 72 (observing that “the best indicators of future violence are past violent behavior by the same
person in similar circumstances”). See also supra note 102 and accompanying text (reporting that
hypervigilance is one of the effects of PTSD).
139. See, e.g., BROWNE, supra note 13, at 129-30.
140. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 73, at 16. Moreover, a woman who tries to protect herself
by hiding a weapon to use when the batterer resumes his attack may be deemed to have acted
with premeditation and thus convicted of first-degree murder.
141. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 99, at 145 (concluding that “Judy Norman could not
escape without fear of being caught and beaten, as she had been beaten in the past”); Schopp,
Sturgis & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 104 (observing that battered women who unsuccessfully
tried to seek help “can cogently argue that effective legal alternatives were not available,” and
others “might demonstrate the necessity of defensive force through expert testimony regarding
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and even killed when they try to leave the relationship and the batterer fears
that he is losing control.142
Third, even though “inevitable future harm” may not be the same as
“imminent harm,”143 imminence is in some sense a proxy for necessity.144 The

the lack of effective legal protection in their jurisdiction”). For a general discussion of the
inadequacy of current legal remedies and the “helplessness” of social agencies in addressing the
needs of battered women, see supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
142.
At least half of women who leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further
attacked by them. In one study of interspousal homicide, more than half of the men who
killed their spouses did so when the partners were separated; in contrast, less than ten
percent of women who killed were separated at the time . . . . Men who kill their wives
described their feeling of loss of control over the woman as a primary factor . . . . “[T]he
decision by a battered woman to leave is often met with escalated violence by the
batterer.”
Mahoney, supra note 21, at 64-65 (quoting Barbara Hart, Beyond the “Duty to Warn”: A
Therapist’s “Duty to Protect” Battered Women and Children, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
WIFE ABUSE 234, 240 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988) (alteration in original)). See
also Dutton, supra note 73, at 14 (noting that the phenomenon of “separation abuse – retaliation
for a woman’s efforts to separate from the abuser or to end the relationship” – is “validated . . . by
homicide statistics”); Fischer, Vidmar & Ellis, supra note 114, at 2138 (reporting that “[t]he most
dangerous time for a battered woman is when she separates from her partner”); Miller, supra note
137, at 308 (reporting that three-fourths of battered women are beaten after they are separated or
divorced) (citing CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, CRIME PREVENTION CENTER,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HANDBOOK: A VICTIM’S GUIDE 3 (1988)).
143. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. 1989) (holding that “a defendant’s subjective
belief of what might be ‘inevitable’ at some indefinite point in the future does not equate to what
she believes to be ‘imminent’”).
144. See FLETCHER, supra note 66, §10.5; PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §
131(c)(1)-(2) (1984); Burke, supra note 86, at 278 (observing that “[a]s a factor acting
independent of necessity, the imminency of the threat has no exculpatory value to a claim of selfdefense”); Rosen, supra note 137, at 380 (noting that “the concept of imminence has no
significance independent of the notion of necessity”); Lawrence P. Tiffany & Carl A. Anderson,
Legislating the Necessity Defense in Criminal Law, 52 DENV. L. J. 839, 846-47 (1975) (pointing
out that the “temporal ‘imminence’ of the threat may be . . . evidence of a lack of alternatives, but
the absence of temporal ‘imminence’ is not proof of the existence of alternatives”). See also
Nourse, supra note 7, at 1259 n.117 (citing cases that “explicitly equate imminence and
alternatives”). Cf. Queen v. Petel, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3, 13-14 (Can.) (noting that Canadian selfdefense law considers imminence “only one of the factors which the jury should weigh in
determining whether the accused had a reasonable apprehension of danger and a reasonable belief
that she could not extricate herself otherwise than by killing the attacker”).
In fact, Professor Rosen has pointed out that historically, “imminence of impending
harm was not a specific requirement” of either of the two forerunners of our contemporary selfdefense defense, and he therefore concludes that imminence does not have “an unquestioned
historical lineage as a fundamental requirement for a finding of self-defense.” Rosen, supra note
137, at 382, 387. Rosen therefore advocates that the imminence requirement be relaxed such that
if a defendant satisfies the burden of production by presenting substantial evidence that defensive
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battered woman who kills her sleeping husband arguably satisfies that notion
of imminence, just like the hostage who is being slowly poisoned over a period
of time, or who has been told to expect to die later in the week, and who
suddenly has a window of opportunity to attack her kidnapper and save her
life.145
Finally, it is important to note that standard self-defense doctrine requires
only a reasonable belief in the imminence of the threat, and not actual
imminence. As the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals observed, “the issue
is not whether the danger was in fact imminent, but whether, given the
circumstances as she perceived them, the defendant’s belief was reasonable
that the danger was imminent.”146
Nevertheless, some critics counter, the imminence requirement cannot be
satisfied in non-confrontational cases because the woman always had the
option of leaving before the abuser woke up.147 In addition to the difficulties
force was necessary to defend against a non-imminent threat, the jury would be instructed to
consider only whether self-defense was necessary, with imminence being one relevant factor but
not an absolute prerequisite. See id. at 405-06.
145. See Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 12 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (analogizing the battered
woman’s situation to “the classic hostage situation”); Robinson v. State, 417 S.E.2d 88, 91 (S.C.
1992) (concluding that “[w]here torture appears interminable and escape impossible, the belief
that only the death of the batterer can provide relief may be reasonable in the mind of a person of
ordinary firmness”); ROBINSON, supra note 144, § 131(c)(1) (posing a similar hypothetical and
concluding that “[i]f a threatened harm is such that it cannot be avoided if the intended victim
waits until the last moment, the principle of self-defense must permit him to act earlier – as early
as is required to defend himself effectively”).
146. Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 12. See also Smith v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 823 (Ga. 1997);
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 453-54 (Ky. 1999).
147. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE 28-29 n.12 (1994) (arguing that
“[n]owhere in the civilized world do self-defense laws justify the killing or maiming of a sleeping
spouse by a woman who has the option of either leaving or calling the police”); FLETCHER, supra
note 99, at 134-35 (observing that a woman who kills a sleeping batterer has “a problem
justifying the killing as the fear of imminent attack” and the “further problem . . . that she [has] to
explain why she did not seize a less extreme means of avoiding [his] brutality – namely, running
away”). Cf. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (Fla. 1999) (noting that the prosecutor in
that case – which involved a killing “during a violent argument,” not under non-confrontational
circumstances – “stressed as ‘critical’ that the killing could not be considered justifiable homicide
unless Weiand had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, including fleeing her
home”).
These failure-to-exhaust-all-options arguments are reminiscent of those made in some
sexual assault cases, where women are asked why they did not scream, fight back, or use some
other means to escape a violent man. See, e.g., People v. Warren, 446 N.E.2d 591, 593-94 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983) (holding that “it was incumbent upon [the woman] to resist,” and noting that a
5’2”, 105-pound woman attacked in the middle of an isolated woods by a 6’3”, 185-pound man
did not scream, try to flee, or “tell [him] to leave her alone or put her down”); State v. Rusk, 424
A.2d 720, 733-34 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting) (arguing that women “must follow the natural
instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than words, the violation of her person by a
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that a battered woman faces in leaving the relationship or otherwise protecting
herself from the abuse,148 other commentators have pointed out that “a rule that
demands the defendant ‘avoid the confrontation’” by leaving the relationship is
“a ‘pre-retreat’ rule [that] . . . has never been part of standard self-defense
law.”149 Just as “[t]he man who goes for the fiftieth time to the violent gangbar is not deprived of his self-defense claim because he ‘should have left’
before the violence erupted,” the law should likewise recognize that “[t]here is
no general duty to avoid violence before the confrontation” when battered
women raise a claim of self-defense.150
Once again, the battered woman is simply asking the courts to faithfully
apply the standard self-defense doctrine to her case, something that the courts
are seemingly reluctant to do.151 In her survey of twenty years of self-defense
cases in which imminence factored as a major issue, Victoria Nourse found
that most of the cases involving battered women, like most of the rest of her
sample, involved killings during a confrontation – not killings while the
batterer was asleep or otherwise following “a significant time lag.”152 Thus,

stranger or an unwelcomed friend,” and asking there why the victim “did not seek a means of
escape,” “did not even ‘try the door’ to determine if it was locked,” and “fail[ed] to flee, summon
help, scream, or make physical resistance”); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164
(Pa. 1994) (observing that the woman there “‘took no physical action to discourage [the man],’”
and “never attempted to go to the door or unlock it”) (quoting trial transcript). In that context,
feminist critics of the rape laws have pointed out that such arguments reflect the law’s historic
devaluation of women’s testimony and its insistence on holding women to the “traditional male
notion of a fight.” SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 62 (1987). See also People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d
110, 117-18, 118-19 (Cal. 1986) (pointing out that “[t]he requirement that a woman resist her
attacker appears to have been grounded in the basic distrust with which courts and commentators
traditionally viewed a woman’s testimony regarding sexual assault,” and citing studies showing
that “while some women respond to sexual assault with active resistance, others [may] ‘freeze,’”
smile, or appear calm).
148. See supra notes 80, 114-19, 140-42, and accompanying text.
149. Nourse, supra note 7, at 1284.
150. Id. See also Dutton, supra note 104, at 1226-27 (noting that the “common perception
[that a battered woman should leave the relationship] is contrary to a fundamental legal premise”
because “‘[t]he law has always been clear . . . that a person has no obligation to rearrange her . . .
entire life, or even inconvenience [her]self, in order to avoid a situation in which the need to act
in self-defense might arise’”) (quoting CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE:
BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW 146 (1989)); Rosen, supra note 137, at 39697 (noting that even if a battered woman “could have escaped safely from her house and fled to
Alaska, where she could change her identity and live happily, and safely, ever after,” the law has
never “required completely innocent people to behave in this fashion” and has never demanded
“[r]enunciation of personal and family identity”). Cf. Maguigan, supra note 7, at 419 (noticing
the “tendency to blur the definition of the retreat rule with the question of whether the woman
could have escaped the relationship”).
151. See Nourse, supra note 7.
152. Id. at 1253.
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the imminence standard tended to “operate as a proxy for any number of other
self-defense factors.”153 The real hurdle battered women faced was that their
“cases are in general not seen as ‘real fights,’” so that “even when the cases are
confrontational – when the gun is pointed at her – they still are not seen as
confrontational.”154 These findings led Nourse to conclude that the imminence
requirement is “far from as settled or coherent as it is assumed to be.”155
Nourse contends, however, that focusing on the necessity for self-defense
instead of imminence, as suggested above, does not “resolve the potential for
conflict in the law of imminence,” but “simply transform[s] the question of the
meaning of imminence into the meaning of necessity.”156 But, as Nourse and
others have aptly noted, standard criminal doctrine does not invariably require
a strict finding of necessity in order to justify a self-defense acquittal. The law
of self-defense “depart[s] from the rule of ‘objective necessity’”157 when it
allows a defendant to kill in self-defense if facing a threat of only serious
bodily harm158 and when it refuses to require defenders to first fire a warning
shot.159 Additionally, and most notable for our purposes, the law of selfdefense in most jurisdictions deviates from a strict necessity requirement when
it allows the use of deadly force despite the availability of a clear path of
retreat.160 The law thereby evidences a willingness to defer to “manly
instincts” without even flinching,161 while insisting that battered women satisfy

153. Id. at 1236 (specifying “strength of threat, retreat, proportionality, and aggression” as the
issues for which imminence operated as a proxy).
154. Id. at 1286. This finding corroborates the similar conclusion Holly Maguigan reached
based on her survey of 270 appellate court opinions issued in 223 battered women’s homicide
cases. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
155. Nourse, supra note 7, at 1237.
156. Id. at 1271. See also id. at 1276-77 (noting that self-defense law’s view as to what
conduct is “necessary” has shifted over time).
157. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 333 (1996).
158. See, e.g., id. at 329; Nourse, supra note 7, at 1270.
159. See Nourse, supra note 7, at 1270. See also Rosen, supra note 137, at 396 (noting that
“[t]he possibility always exists that a person attacking another with a gun will change his mind, or
miss, or have a heart attack before pulling the trigger,” and thus concluding that “the law never
requires the necessity to be absolute before allowing self-defense”).
160. See Nourse, supra note 7, at 1270; Rosen, supra note 137, at 388-90.
161. Estrich, supra note 56, at 1434. See also State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1961)
(concluding that a retreat requirement would “demand what smacks of cowardice” because “the
manly thing to do is to hold one’s ground”); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 8, § 5.7(f) (noting
that the majority approach is based on “a policy against making one act a cowardly and
humiliating role”).
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a special “pre-retreat” requirement unenforced elsewhere in self-defense
law.162
V. JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE?
Critics of battered women’s self-defense claims also argue that women
claiming self-defense in non-confrontational cases are really advancing an
excuse for their conduct, rather than a justification,163 and therefore,
presumably by definition, are not entitled to the justification of self-defense.
Under well-established principles of criminal law, however, even self-defense
is not invariably a justification. For example, the defense is available when a
defendant kills a perfectly innocent person who the defendant reasonably, but
mistakenly believed was about to launch an attack. In those circumstances, the
defense operates more as an excuse than a justification.164 Moreover, as
explained above, standard self-defense doctrine departs from a strict
requirement of necessity in certain instances, thereby also deviating from our
usual notions of justification.165
The ambiguous nature of self-defense – a defense widely thought of as a
justification – confirms that the criminal law does not clearly distinguish
between justifications and excuses.166 One commentator has thus written that

162. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 157, at 373, 333 (accusing self-defense law of
“appear[ing] to shift opportunistically” because “to say that the law cannot be adjusted to
privilege deadly force” used by “a woman who kills rather than endure the degradation of
continued abuse . . . because the law never ranks the defendant’s honor and dignity over a
wrongful aggressor’s life betrays either extreme confusion or hypocrisy”).
163. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 86, at 242-43; Coughlin, supra note 83, at 28 (referring to
the “battered woman syndrome defense” as a “special excuse for women”); Margulies, supra note
82, at 63 (arguing that the battered woman syndrome “sounds largely in the key of excuse, not
justification”); Morse, supra note 53, at 12-13; Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense:
Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11,
43-44 (1986) (maintaining that “successful use of the battered person’s defense theory . . . is
inherently inconsistent with the concept of justification,” and therefore advocating that selfdefense be thought of as an excuse).
164. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 66, at 767; Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification:
Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 283-84 (1975);
Glanville Williams, The Theory of Excuses, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 732, 739.
165. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 954
(1985); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1897, 1897 (1984) (observing that there is no “systematic” difference between the two);
Robinson, supra note 164, at 276 (noting that “[t]he early common law distinction between
justification and excuse exists today only in theory”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

SO MUCH ACTIVITY, SO LITTLE CHANGE

187

the whole issue is “much ado about little.”167 On the other hand, Stephen
Morse has staked out the contrary position, describing this as “one of the most
important issues modern criminal law thought has addressed,” in large part
because “the law is a teacher that sets moral and social standards” and “the
distinction encourages doing right and deters doing wrong.”168 He may well
have a point, but one wonders why those same concerns are not raised when
male defendants who did “wrong,” but made a reasonable mistake about the
need to use defensive force, are acquitted on grounds of self-defense.
From the perspective of the individual defendant, presumably most people
would be indifferent between a not guilty verdict based on a justification and
one based on an excuse. As Glanville Williams observed, “the distinction does
not concern the person who is charged with the offence in question and who
sets up the defence.”169 Anne Coughlin rejects that assumption, however,
arguing that battered women are in fact “harmed by the finding of
irresponsibility that their successful excuse defenses incur” because “the
dubious moral status occupied by the excused actor – that creature who is more
like a ‘dog’ or a ‘rock’ than a human being” – reinforces gender stereotypes
and thus “has profound implications for the construction of gender.”170
Interestingly, Coughlin’s description of defendants who raise a successful
duress defense has very a different tone. Quoting Michael Moore’s comment
that the threats which give rise to a duress defense “interfere with one’s normal
ability or opportunity to do what is morally or legally required,”171 Coughlin
observes that the defendant who acts under duress is excused because “the
alternatives open to him were so agonizing that we accept his claim that he was
carrying out a course of conduct that he did not choose – and would not have
chosen – for himself.”172 Thus, in Coughlin’s view, “[t]he model of the
responsible actor is heavily inscribed on the duress defense” even though, as
she notes, duress is generally considered an excuse rather than a
justification.173 Why don’t those defendants suffer from the same “dubious
moral status” as the battered woman Coughlin characterizes as “less than a full

167. Rosen, supra note 137, at 407-08 (noting that “[n]either jurors nor putative defendants
are aware of the subtle differences between a justification and excuse, and . . . few judges could
explain the difference”).
168. Morse, supra note 53, at 7.
169. Williams, supra note 164, at 732.
170. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 23-24.
171. Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1129 (1985)
(quoted in Coughlin, supra note 83, at 15 n.65).
172. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 16.
173. Id. at 29-30 n.143.
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human being”?174 Why do we simply “withhold blame” from defendants
excused by duress rather than “harm[] [them] by [a] finding of
irresponsibility”?175 While Coughlin is certainly right to criticize the gender
stereotypes that underlay the now-discarded doctrine of marital coercion,176
one wonders whether it is those same stereotypes – and the devaluation of
women, their experiences, and their stories that they reflect – that lead her to
describe a battered woman’s self-defense claim so differently from that of the
defendant who acted under duress.
VI. THE ABUSE EXCUSE
A related objection argues that battered women’s self-defense claims fall
prey to “the determinist reductio”177 or – in somewhat more colorful terms –
that they are illustrative of the “abuse excuse” crisis sweeping through criminal
law.178 According to Stephen Morse, the fact that a defendant may be able to
pinpoint a cause for her use of violence – i.e., the history of abuse in the case
of battered women – cannot give rise to a defense because “[p]resumably all
phenomena of the universe are caused by the necessary and sufficient
conditions that produce them.”179 Allowing “determinism or universal
causation [to] underwrite[] responsibility,” Morse continues, “threatens to
undermine notions of personal responsibility that are vital to human dignity
and the fair operation of the criminal justice system.”180 In a similar vein, Alan
Dershowitz argues that “the abuse excuse is a symptom of a general abdication
of responsibility” that “is dangerous to the very tenets of democracy, which
And,
presuppose personal accountability for choices and actions.”181
according to Dershowitz, “[i]t all began with the so-called battered woman
syndrome.”182

174. Id. at 4. Cf. Nourse, supra note 39, at 1454 (making a similar point with respect to
provocation, noting that “[f]ew scholars . . . have urged that we eliminate the provocation defense
because it diminishes men’s moral agency”).
175. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 30, 23 (observing that duress is characterized as an excuse
because “the community prefers that actors not offend, even under the pressure of serious threats,
but will withhold blame where the threats are sufficiently grievous”).
176. See supra note 97.
177. Morse, supra note 53, at 8.
178. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 3 (defining the “abuse excuse” as “the legal tactic by
which criminal defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation”).
179. Morse, supra note 53, at 8.
180. Id. at 8, 9.
181. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 4.
182. Id. at 45. See also FLETCHER, supra note 99, at 140 (arguing that “we are witnessing the
beginning of a transformation of the battered women’s syndrome into a general defense of abuse
as a justification for retaliation”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble
with Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825, 854-55 (1995) (arguing that “an abusive partner, and similar
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These critiques are valid, at least to a point. As Michael Moore noted
almost twenty years ago, the ability to identify a causal factor that explains
one’s crime cannot itself afford an excuse because “the causal theory of excuse
leads to the absurd conclusion that no one is responsible for anything.”183 The
real question is whether the particular causative factor indicates blamelessness
– a question that cannot be answered without making a subjective value
judgment as to which causal factors ought to constitute excuses.184 Once
again, then, the problem with this critique is that the law governing criminal
defenses has always been comfortable accepting determinist arguments in
certain contexts – that, in the words of Victoria Nourse, “almost all excuses
become abuse excuses.”185 Thus, the law takes it for granted that reasonable
people will use deadly force when confronted by an “uplifted knife,”186 that the
man who finds his wife in bed with someone else will lose control and react
with violence,187 and that no “manly” individual will retreat from home in
order to escape an attacker.188 Why are those defendants not asked to take
“personal responsibility” for their actions? Or, as Nourse puts it, “why not
demand that those who act under duress or provocation also exercise selfcontrol?”189
Likewise, although Professor Dershowitz is certainly correct in pointing
out that “the vast majority of people who have experienced abuse . . . do not
commit violent crimes,”190 the same can be said of defenses long accepted by
the criminal law. Many people faced with an “uplifted knife” will not respond

predisposing conditions do not by themselves negate responsibility,” and “we must condemn and
seek to deter criminal acts when the perpetrators could have done otherwise – even if their
motives evoke sympathy”).
183. Moore, supra note 171, at 1092.
184. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 157, at 274 (maintaining that the so-called “abuse
excuse” is a sign not of “lawlessness,” but of the law’s “responsiveness . . . to changes in . . .
social norms”); Morse, supra note 53, at 9 (acknowledging that “free will is often just a handwaving placeholder for the conclusion that the defendant ought to be excused”).
185. Nourse, supra note 39, at 1446, 1447 (explaining that most of criminal law’s wellaccepted defenses – such as self-defense, duress, insanity, and provocation – are based on the
“behavioristic causal explanation” that the defendant’s “practical ability to choose, and thus to
exercise self-control, has been impaired”).
186. See Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (“Detached reflection cannot be
demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.”).
187. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
189. Nourse, supra note 39, at 1447. Cf. Chiu, supra note 94, at 1239 (describing how
various aspects of the law are inconsistent as to whether they view battered women as “purely
agents, purely victims, or a combination of both”).
190. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 5-6.
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with defensive force,191 most people who find their partner in bed with another
will not react violently,192 and some who are subjected to threats will not
succumb and commit a crime.193 Nevertheless, the fact that many people are
able to avoid violent or otherwise criminal behavior in these circumstances has
not led to widespread outcry for the abolition of the defenses of duress,
provocation, or self-defense.194 Nor has the fact that, to a large extent, these
defenses, premised as they are on a male model of behavior, tend to be of
greatest benefit to a subset of society – namely, men – who are more likely to
act in ways that require that they avail themselves of the defenses. To return to
Victoria Nourse once again, “law has always exercised judgment; it simply has
lost the ability to see that this is what it is doing.”195
VII. CONCLUSION
“Allowing victims of abuse to invoke an abuse excuse, while doing
nothing to prevent the underlying abuse, is little more than symbolism on the
191. See State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 570 (N.J. 1997) (commenting that “[t]he male
pronouns in the Code reflect a history of self-defense that is derived from a male model”);
Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in
Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 149, 153 (1978) (noting that
“[s]tandards of justifiable homicide have been based on male models and expectations”;
“[f]amiliar images of self-defense are a soldier, a man protecting his home, family, or the chastity
of his wife, or a man fighting off an assailant”).
192. See Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections
on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 726, 735-36 (1995) (describing provocation as a “male-oriented doctrine” because
it primarily benefits male defendants by “mitigating the predominantly male reaction of
retaliating for affronts and other ‘injustices’”); Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in
Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1679, 1692, 1697 (1986) (noting that historically only men were deemed reasonably provoked by
witnessing an act of spousal adultery, and that even our contemporary gender-neutral standard is
“a shallow concession to equality” given that “women rarely react to their husband’s infidelity
with deadly violence”).
193. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 446-47 (2d ed. 1960)
(characterizing as “debatable” the assumption that people “will always choose to live even though
they must kill unoffending persons to preserve themselves”).
194. Note, however, that in 1997, the Maryland legislature amended its definition of
manslaughter so as to provide that “[t]he discovery of one’s spouse engaged in sexual intercourse
with another does not constitute legally adequate provocation for the purpose of mitigating a
killing from the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing was provoked
by that discovery.” MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. § 2-207(b) (2002). The law was passed in response
to several Maryland cases where a husband successfully avoided a murder conviction by claiming
that he was provoked to kill his wife because he discovered or suspected that she was having an
affair. See Kimberly Wilmot-Weidman, After a Three-Year Fight, Murder Is Finally Murder in
Maryland, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1997, § CN (Womanews), at 1.
195. Nourse, supra note 39, at 1461.
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cheap,” Alan Dershowitz charges.196 In somewhat less provocative terms,
Anne Coughlin urges that we “change our experiences, perhaps even eliminate
domestic violence,” by “persuad[ing] the community to change its assumptions
about gender relationships.”197 It is certainly important to remind ourselves to
keep our eyes on the ball – not to allow the relatively small number of cases
where battered women kill their abusers under non-confrontational
circumstances to divert our attention from the plight of the much larger number
of women victimized by domestic violence. But I know of no one who
advocates “doing nothing” about these larger issues and simply focusing on
self-defense as the solution to the problem of domestic violence.
The difficulty in the short run with the suggestion that we focus our energy
on putting an end to domestic violence is that cases involving nonconfrontational killings do arise, and they make their way to court. From the
individual defendant’s perspective, as Catharine MacKinnon noted in another
context, “[a] prison term is a big price to pay for principle” and “arousing the
sexism of the jury may appear her only chance of acquittal.”198 From a broader
societal perspective, the criminal justice system is charged with the immediate
task of assessing culpability and must therefore attempt to adjudicate the merits
of a battered woman’s self-defense claim in a principled manner.
In the longer term, the difficulty with the proposal that we simply end
domestic violence is that it is much easier said than done. As our experience
with thirty years of reform efforts has demonstrated, the gender bias that leads
individual men to feel free to beat their partners – and that leads society to treat
that violence more cavalierly than it treats stranger assaults – is so well
entrenched that it has proven very resistant to change. In the meantime, and
certainly while we continue our efforts to end violence against women, we
should also recognize the gender bias so firmly embedded in our criminal laws
and strive to give battered women’s self-defense claims the same consideration
we have traditionally afforded to defenses raised by male defendants.

196. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 147, at 39.
197. Coughlin, supra note 83, at 65. See also People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 174 (Ct.
App. 1989) (noting, in rejecting battered woman’s self-defense claim, that while “alternative
means of resolving [a] battered woman’s problem, . . . such as restraining orders, shelters, and
criminal prosecution of the batterer, . . . have proved tragically inadequate in some cases, the
solution is to improve those means, not to lessen our standards of protection against the
unjustified and unexcused taking of life”), overruled on other grounds by People v. Humphrey,
921 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1996); Faigman & Wright, supra note 82, at 70 (suggesting that “the proper
solution is to devote the necessary resources to the eradication of domestic violence”).
198. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 STAN. L. REV. 703, 721
(1982) (discussing insanity defenses raised by battered women).
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